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NOTES 
Minority Enterprise, Federal Contracting, and the SBA's 
8(a) Program: A New Approach to an Old Problem 
More and more thoughtful students of the race problem are be-
ginning to see that business and industry constitute what we may call 
the strategic point in its solution .... [F]rom [these professions] we 
shall gradually advance to all the rights and privileges which any 
class of citizens enjoy. It is in business and industry that I see the 
brightest and most hopeful phases of the race situation today.-
Booker T. Washington (1907)t 
It is distressing to realize that the hope embodied in these 
apparently timely sentiments was expressed sixty-five years ago, yet 
even today racial and ethnic minority group members are virtually 
excluded from the world of business and commerce. Although the 
past two decades witnessed major strides toward equal opportunity 
in employment, education, housing, and voting, no program was 
initiated to aid minority business until the late 1960's.1 Now that 
the federal government is mounting the first coordinated effort to 
supplement the opportunity for minority group members to par-
ticipate as entrepreneurs in the American economy, it faces two 
fundamental problems. An obvious problem is the immense techni-
cal difficulty of interjecting these disadvantaged individuals into an 
already highly developed and competitive economy. A more subtle 
concern is the "reverse discrimination"2 aspect of the minority 
enterprise effort and the spectre of unconstitutionality that confronts 
this effort because of traditional equal protection doctrines. 
In partial response to the problems of the minority businessman, 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) has developed the S(a) 
Program3 to channel government contracts to businesses owned by 
t THE NEGRO IN BUSINESS 19-20. 
I. In fact, there is substantial evidence that the massive desegregation begun in 
the mid-1950's actually led to a decline in the number of minority businesses. Deprived 
of their long-protected consumer markets by the dropping of color barriers, small 
minority businesses could not compete with larger, more efficient nonminority busi• 
nesses. See THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 292 (1966). See also Brimmer, De-
segregation and Negro Leadership, in BUSINESS L'EADERSmP AND THE NEGRO CRISIS 34-38 
(E. Ginzberg ed. 1968); T. CROSS, BLACK CAPITALISM 61-64 (1969). 
2. The expression "reverse discrimination" is used here generally to denote a state 
action that distinguishes benveen individuals on the basis of race or ethnic origin to 
the benefit of those who have traditionally been oppressed-for example, American 
Indians, blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Mexican-Americans. 
3. The Program was so named because it was developed pursuant to section 8(a) 
of the Small Business Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970), which provides: 
It shall be the duty of the Administration and it is empowered, whenever it 
determines such action is necessary-
(!) to enter into contracts with the United States Government and any de-
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disadvantaged persons. This is accomplished through a procedure 
whereby the SBA contracts with another federal agency to provide 
that agency with goods or services, and then subcontracts that obliga-
tion to a qualified small business on a noncompetitive basis. The 
withdrawal of these contracts from competitive bidding has recently 
resulted in the institution of a number of federal court suits4 alleging 
partment, agency, or officer thereof having procurement powers obligating the 
Administration to furnish articles, equipment, supplies, or materials to the Gov-
ernment. In any case in which the Administration certifies to any officer of the 
Government having procurement powers that the Administration is competent to 
perform any specific Government procurement contract to be let by any such officer, 
such officer shall be authorized in his discretion to let such procurement contract 
to the Administration upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon 
between the Administration and the procurement officer; and 
(2) to arrange for the performance of such contracts by negotiating or other-
wise letting subcontracts to small-business concerns or others for the manufacture, 
supply, or assembly of such articles, equipment, supplies, or materials, or parts 
thereof, or servicing or processing in connection therewith, or such management 
services as may be necessary to enable the Administration to perform such contracts. 
For a more detailed discussion of the Program, see notes 22·25 infra and accompanying 
text. 
4. A synopsis of the district court suits is presented below: 
A. Cases Closed 
I. Big Four Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. SBA, Civil No. 70-312 (W.D. Okla.). 
Case dismissed without prejudice by agreement of the parties. 
2. Cheyenne Bldg. Maintenance Corp. v. SBA, Civil No. C-2583 (D. Colo., Nov. 
2, 1970). Case dismissed without prejudice by agreement of the parties. 
3. Caltex Engr. Co. v. Seaman, Civil No. 71-1236-ALS (C.D. Cal., Aug. 3, 1971). 
Case dismissed voluntarily after denial of a temporary restraining order. 
4. Kleen-Rite Janitorial Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 71-1988-W (D. Mass., 
Sept. 21, 1971). Judge Wyzanski dismissed plaintiff's claim, holding that the 
Department of Defense bad no duty to offer the contract for competitive bidding 
and that the fifth amendment was not violated since there was no racial classi-
fication. 
5. Analytical Systems Corp. v. SBA, Civil No. 71-1638-F (D. Mass. 1971). The 
court denied a motion for a temporary restraining order, and the SBA awarded 
the subcontract. 
6. Space Servs., Inc. v. SBA (D. Ariz.). Case dismissed when the Air Force with-
drew the contract from the 8(a) Program because of an allegation that the 
contract constituted a "significant" part of plaintiff's business. 
7. Space Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972). Case 
dismissed for failure to state a claim. The court upheld the S(a) Program against 
charges that it exceeded the congressional authorization and held plaintiff 
lacked standing to charge that minorities were being favored in an unconsti-
tutional manner. 
8. Fortec Constructors v. Kleppe, 41 U.S.L.W. 2195 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1972). The 
court held that there was proper authorization for the 8(a) Program and that 
plaintiff lacked standing to charge that minorities were being unconstitutionally 
favored. 
B. Active Cases 
1. Pacific Coast Util. Serv., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. C-71-1035 LHB (N.D. Cal. 
1971). A preliminary injunction was issued against the Government, and on 
appeal the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for a trial on the merits, which is 
still pending. 
2. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
Holding that the subcontracts awarded by the SBA were unauthorized and un-
constitutional, the court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiff. On January 
5, 1973, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, No. 72-1163. 
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inter alia that the S(a) Program denies to whites the equal protection 
of the laws guaranteed by the Constitution. 5 After reviewing the con-
siderations that led to the development of the S(a) Program, this Note 
will examine the statutory and constitutional challenges to the Pro-
gram. Finally, the potential impact of the S(a) litigation on other 
federal minority enterprise programs will be considered. 
I. THE NEED To STIMULATE EXPANSION OF MINORITY BUSINESS 
VENTURES AND THE SBA's RESPONSE 
The Report of the President's Advisory Council on Minority 
Business Enterprise6 culminated a growing list of works document-
ing the degree and consequences of excluding minorities from the 
business world.7 It is now known that blacks, American Indians, and 
Spanish-speaking Americans, who comprise one sixth of our popu-
lation, own less than three per cent of all businesses,8 and hold less 
than one half of one per cent of the nation's capital.0 If this stagger-
ing disparity alone was not enough to motivate a national effort on 
behalf of minority enterprise, there are indications that increased 
minority participation in business would also contribute to the solu-
tion of noncommercial aspects of the race problem. 
The establishment of a new class of successful businessmen would 
aid in providing forceful, responsible leadership in the ghetto.10 
These entrepreneurs and their businesses would bolster ghetto-area 
3. Lambert Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, Civil No. 71-3037-Sec. H (E.D. La. 1971). By 
agreement of the parties, proceedings had been postponed pending the decision 
of the Fifth Circuit in Ray Baillie Trash Hauling. 
4. Pacific Coast Util. Serv., Inc. v. Kleppe, Civil No. 329-71C2 (W.D. Wash. 1971). 
Plaintiff's motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 
were denied. 
5. Massey Serv., Inc. v. Kleppe, Civil No. 72-556 WTS (N.D. Cal., complaint 
filed March 18, 1972). No decision has yet been reached on whether to issue a 
preliminary injunction. 
5. Although the fourteenth amendment applies only to the states, its equal protec-
tion concepts have been extended to the federal government through the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
6. PRESIDENT'S .ADVISORY COUNCIL ON MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, MINORITY 
ENTERPRISE AND EXPANDED OWNERSHIP: BLUEPRINT FOR THE 70's (1971) [hereinafter 
CouNCIL REPORT]. '.This Council, established by Exec. Order No. 11458, 34 Fed. Reg. 
4937 (1969) (since superseded by Exec. Order No. 11625, 3 C.F.R. 213 (Comp. 1971)), is 
variously referred to as the National Advisory Council on Minority Business Enterprise, 
the Advisory Council on Minority Business Enterprise, or the President's Council on 
Minority Business Enterprise. 
7. For an excellent compilation of works focusing on the status of the black business-
man, see Institute for Minority Business Education, Howard University, The Negro in 
the Field of Business (An Annotated Bibliography) (T. Halliday ed. June 1970). 
8. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5. 
9. M. STANS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 3 (1970). 
10. Green & Faux, The Social Utility of Black Enterprise, in BLACK ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 31 (W. Haddadt & G. Pugh ed. 1969). 
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employment. Perhaps more important, their growing economic 
power would undoubtedly foster a corresponding growth in political 
power. Ultimately, expansion of minority enterprise would increase 
interaction in the commercial sphere among the different racial and 
ethnic groups, and such interaction would provide a foundation for 
mutual respect based upon ability. These unspoken factors as well 
as the goal of economic parity undoubtedly prompted the Presi-
dent's Council to designate the minority enterprise movement a 
national priority for the 1970's.11 
It is perhaps not obvious why the federal government must engi-
neer this problem's solution. It is clear that the normal operation of 
our economic system cannot result in significant growth of minority 
enterprise in the foreseeable future. Even if minorities could increase 
the success rate of their enterprises to the present national average 
and initiate twice the number of new businesses per capita as the rest 
of the population, it would take until 1990 for the sparse number of 
minority businesses to double.12 Moreover, there is little hope that 
such campaigns as "buy black" will benefit minority businesses be-
cause minority consumers, more than anyone else, cannot afford the 
higher prices usually charged by small minority concerns.13 Self-help 
remedies alone cannot significantly increase the minority share of 
commercial revenues; some additional factor is necessary to precipi-
tate change. 
Although there are high hopes for the private sector's eventual 
involvement in the effort, established firms may be unable to cope 
with the problem alone. The fact that private aid comes from many 
diverse sources precludes effective coordination. Furthermore, pri-
vate institutions are, by their nature, responsive to the short-run eco-
nomic climate, which makes vital long-term commitments extremely 
speculative. Perhaps the most basic reason that private sources are 
inadequate is the magnitude of the task.14 The federal government 
alone has the resources and technology to lead a coordinated attack 
on this problem, and in a larger sense it is a problem that any govern-
ment professing equality has a moral obligation to address. 
A review of basic business statistics illustrates the difficulties 
11. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
12. M. STANS, supra note 9, Foreword, at 6-7. 
13. There arc at least four reasons why minority group members do not attempt to 
buy exclusively or primarily from their own group. Three are economic-lower prices 
prevail at chain stores; many minority group members need to buy on credit, which 
small ghetto stores cannot extend; and smaller stores may often give less service. Drake 
& Cayton, Negro Business: Myth and Fact, in BLACK BusINES.5 ENTERPRISE 67 (R. Bailey 
ed. 1971). The fourth reason is that status may be derived from buying in white stores. 
CouNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. 
14. For an authoritative discussion of the weaknesses of private efforts and the 
reasons for the federal government assuming the role of leadership, see M. STANS, supra 
note 9, pt. I, at 15-16; pt. II, at 1-2. 
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inherent in a federal minority enterprise effort. It is axiomatic that 
the casualty rate for small businesses is highest in the first three 
years of operation. Dun and Bradstreet reports that as of 1968 more 
than twenty-five per cent of all businesses failed in their first three 
years.10 Three-year failure rates for retail sales and service estab-
lishments, the types of businesses in which minority entrepreneurs 
most often engage,16 were 38.3 per cent and 28.7 per cent, respec-
tively.17 The fundamental reasons for minority group members' entry 
into these high-risk businesses are apparent: such businesses require 
little capital and few technical skills. 
While it is clear that the immediate success of a national 
minority enterprise effort will be roughly in inverse proportion to 
the failure rates of new businesses, a low success rate will also 
jeopardize the community's future receptiveness to minority enter-
prise. Each minority business failure drains scarce, perhaps irre-
placeable capital. Lending institutions willing to finance minority 
businessmen will be deterred from future financing if they experience 
high failure rates. Even more devastating is the psychological impact 
on minority groups from witnessing the failures of some of their most 
highly motivated and adventuresome individuals. Certainly this will 
discourage others from entering business and cause further dis-
illusionment with the present system.18 Lest the minority enterprise 
effort be brought to a halt, or even become counterproductive, those 
few minority businesses that are initiated must be given the maxi-
mum possible chance for success. 
The federal government's sheer size and power do not ensure 
that efforts to stimulate minority enterprise will be successful. The 
unique problems of the minority entrepreneur require imaginative 
solutions. Federal agencies must first ascertain the precise causes 
of minority business failures and then tailor their programs to elim-
inate those causes. After the threshold hurdle of acquiring sufficient 
equity capital, the businessman's immediate difficulty is to sustain his 
enterprise while he gains experience. Indeed, a Dun and Bradstreet's 
report indicates that simple lack of experience accounts for almost 
ninety per cent of business failures in the retail sales and service 
sectors and somewhat less in the remaining areas.19 This problem 
15. DUN & BRADSTREET, !Ne., THE FAll.URE RECORD THROUGH 1968, at 10 (1969). 
16. An unpublished SBA survey in 1969 showed that personal service and retail 
sales businesses comprised over 60 per cent of all minority-owned enterprises but only 
about 40 per cent of nonminority enterprises. Doctors & Lockwood, New Directions for 
Minority Enterprise, 36 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB, 51, 53 (1971) (table I). 
17. DUN & BRADSTREET, INC., supra note 15, at 10. 
18. The belief that there are few opportunities in business for minorities has con-
tributed significantly to the present problem because ambitious minority group 
members have historically chosen the professions as a more viable means of attaining 
success. Doctors & Lockwood, supra note 16, at 55-56. 
19. DUN & BRADSTREET, !Ne., supra note 15, at 12-13. 
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is especially acute for minority entrepreneurs who, because of a his-
tory of discrimination and resultant cultural and educational disad-
vantages, have been deprived of the requisite commercial experi-
ence.20 Thus, a primary goal of the federal minority enterprise effort 
must be to provide businessmen an opportunity to accumulate ex-
perience during a protected incubation period. Compounding the 
lack of experience is the chronic undercapitalization of fledgling 
minority firms. These dual handicaps accentuate what Louis Allen 
has called "the largest disadvantage of small size in business ... the 
inability to absorb error.''21 
In response to these imperatives the SBA utilized its broad 
statutory grant of power in section 8(a) of the Small Business Act22 
to promulgate the regulations that are the basis of the present 8(a) 
Program.28 Essentially, the 8(a) Program utilizes government con-
20. An excellent study conducted by the Bureau of Business Research Services at 
the University of Wisconsin confirms that a critical factor that may determine whether 
minority businesses succeed or fail is experience in the particular line of business. 
Strang, Minority Economic Development: The Problem of Business Failures, 36 LAw &: 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 119, 127 (1971) (table IV). 
21. Making Capitalism Work in the Ghetto, HARV. Bus. REv., May-June 1969, at 82, 
87. 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), set out in note 3 supra. 
23. The regulations promulgated by the SBA, 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.8-1 to -2 (1972) 
provide as follows: 
§ 124.8-1 Introduction. 
(a) General. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act authorizes SBA to enter into 
all types of contracts (including supply, services, construction, research and develop-
ment) with other Government departments and agencies and sub-contract the 
performance of such contracts. 
(b) Purpose. It is the policy of SBA to use such authority to assist small con-
cerns owned by disadvantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses 
capable of competing effectively in the marketplace. 
(c) Eligibility. To be eligible for an 8(a) subcontract, a concern must be owned 
or destined to be owned by socially or economically disadvantaged persons. This 
category often includes, but is not restricted to, Black Americans, American Indians, 
Spanish Americans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and Aleuts. If a concern is not 
presently controlled by such persons, the firm having such control must execute a 
divestiture agreement providing for divestiture of control by the divesting company 
over the concern within a reasonable period of time. The existence of control is a 
question of fact for administrative determination under the circumstances of each 
case. Divestiture of at least 51 per cent of the stock will create a rebuttable 
presumption of divestiture of control. 
(d) Procurement selection criteria. Procurements will be selected which are 
determined suitable for performance by an SBA subcontractor. However, procure• 
ments will not be considered where: 
(1) Public solicitation has been issued; 
(2) There is a reasonable possibility of an award being made to disadvantaged 
contractors under normal competitive procedures; 
or 
(3) Where small business concerns are dependent in whole or in significant 
part on recurring Government contracts. 
§ 124.8-2 Procedures. 
(a) Concerns may submit applications for consideration under this program to 
SBA regional or district offices. Applications will include complete information 
regarding the concern's qualifications and capabilities to perform a contract. 
(b) SBA will review procurement programs of other Government departments 
and agencies and identify proposed procurements suitable for performance by 
potential subcontractors. 
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tracting to provide firms "owned by socially or economically dis-
advantaged persons"24 with an incubation period during which 
they can obtain critical experience while minimizing the risk of 
failure. As noted above, the SBA accomplishes this by executing a 
prime contract with another federal agency, and then subcontracting 
that requirement to a qualified 8(a) firm. The subcontract price 
routinely exceeds that of the prime contract-thus ensuring that the 
subcontracting firm receives a fair profit-and the SBA supplies 
that cost differential. Since the total amount of all SBA subcontracts 
comprises merely one tenth of one per cent of the government's 
huge 45 billion dollar annual procurement budget, the additional 
cost to the government for the S(a) Program-the amount by which 
total subcontract prices exceed total prime contract prices-causes 
only a small increase in aggregate federal contracting expenditures.25 
The S(a) Program is a promising approach, theoretically well 
suited to the needs of inexperienced minority firms. But its lauda-
tory objectives should not obscure a problem that can result from 
unchecked dependency upon government contracts: young firms 
receiving substantial government contracts may be unable to make 
an abrupt and total transition to the private market at the end 
of the three-year incubation period.26 Two factors contribute to this 
problem. First, minority enterprises will generally lack the capital 
to finance a complete changeover from government to private sector 
(c) SBA will determine if a potential subcontractor is competent to perform a 
specific contract and will conduct appropriate negotiations with the otlier agency 
or department for the proposed procurement contract. U.1;>on the request of the 
other agency or department, SBA will certify that the Admmistration is competent 
to perform the contract. Upon agreement as to terms, including price, SBA and 
the agency will enter into a prime contract using forms and provisions prescribed 
by statute and regulations applicable to the other Government agency. Thereafter, 
SBA will enter into appropriate subcontracts with the subcontractors for the per-
formance of the prime contract. 
(d) SBA may provide technical and management assistance to assist in the per-
formance of the subcontracts. 
24. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-l(c), set out in note 23 supra. 
25. This 45 billion dollar figure reflects the total contract awards made by the 
federal government in fiscal 1971. Civilian agencies executed contracts equalling 13.95 
billion dollars (Office of Finance, General Services Administration, Procurement by 
Civilian Executive Agencies (1971) [hereinafter Civilian Procurement]), and the Defense 
Department's contracting totalled 31 billion dollars (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments or Commitments 8 (1971) 
[hereinafter Military Procurement]). In fiscal 1971, the S(a) contracts reached 66 million 
dollars and total federal contracting to minority enterprises was 144 million dollars, 
or roughly 0.15 and 0.3 per cent, respectively, of total procurement. U.S. DEPT. OF 
COMMERCE, PROGRESS OF THE MINORITY BuSINl:SS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM 15 (1972). The 
cost differentials between what the minority subcontractors are paid by the SBA and 
what the SBA received from the contracting agency were expected to be approximately 
12 million dollars in fiscal 1973. U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BTJDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT, FlsCAL YEAR 1973, Appendix, at 933, 935, 937 (1972). 
26. Although not bound by statute or regulations, it has been the SBA's avowed 
policy to limit the period of S(a) aid to three years. 
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product lines. After two or three years of operation most 8(a) firms 
will not yet have ready access to large amounts of equity or debt fi-
nancing. Consequently, they will be unable to invest heavily in new 
capital equipment. The subsequent transition from government to 
private sector markets can succeed only if it makes minimal capital 
demands on the young enterprise. In service and retail businesses the 
transition may be relatively painless, but manufacturing firms are 
likely to experience a severe capital shortage unless a simple precau-
tion is taken: an 8(a) subcontract should not be made to a manufac-
turing concern for a product that has little or no private sector de-
mand. Should this precaution be ignored, some manufacturing firms 
are certain to face the choice of clinging to a specific government re-
quirement as a matter of survival after it is reopened for competitive 
bidding or scrapping otherwise useless capital equipment and buy-
ing wholly different equipment suitable for producing private sector 
goods. Neither, obviously, is a very attractive alternative.27 
The second factor, of more general application, is the lack of 
incentive for any 8(a) subcontractor to develop a marketing system 
and private clientele. With the many production and financial prob-
lems that beset a new enterprise, marketing may be dmrngraded 
if the government guarantees three years of substantial demand. 
When the government contract finally expires, the enterprise may 
have developed few private customers and, moreover, may lack the 
marketing system requisite to build a private clientele fast enough 
to survive this transition. Although the SBA presently exhorts its 
8(a) subcontractors to cultivate their own clientele, a close check 
should be kept on the subcontractors in their critical fourth year to 
determine whether marketing has been properly developed. If, as 
seems likely, marketing proves deficient and some enterprises fail 
because of an abrupt decline in sales volume, one possible solution 
would be to amend the SBA's regulations to require that government 
contracts to an 8(a) firm comprise no more than prescribed and 
declining percentages of the firm's total sales. For example, a firm 
might be required to show that at least twenty per cent of total sales 
in its first year were to the private sector as a condition for renewal 
of the subcontract for the second year. Likewise, the subcontractor 
could be required to show that at least thirty-five per cent of total 
sales accrued to the private sector in the second year in order to 
qualify for the third. While these conditions are harsh, they would 
ensure that firms do not emerge from their incubation periods with 
fatally inadequate marketing systems. 
A different sort of problem-solely of administrative origin-stems 
27. Admittedly, there are few minority-owned manufacturing concerns at this time. 
But these problems will arise as efforts to encourage minority manufacturing meet 
success. 
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from the possibility that subcontract prices that are inadvertently 
set too high may provide an S(a) firm with excess profits that would 
enable it to underbid competitors on other commercial accounts. 
Although there is some evidence of such error,28 it is apparently not 
widespread. Should the problem increase and administrative controls 
fail, limited competitive bidding among certified contractors should 
return profits to more reasonable levels. 
II, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO 
THE S(a) PROGRAM 
Owners of small businesses protesting the withdrawal of govern-
ment contracts from competitive bidding for eventual S(a) sub-
contracting have instituted suit against the SBA challenging the 
validity of the Program on the following three grounds: 
(1) that the S(a) Program is subject to the government's general 
procurement procedures that require the SBA to submit S(a) sub-
contracts for unrestrained competitive bidding; 
(2) that the SBA is not authorized by section 8(a) of the Small 
Business Act or otherwise to promulgate the regulations establishing 
a subcontracting program to aid businesses owned by "socially or 
economically disadvantaged persons"; 
(3) that the eligibility requirements for the S(a) Program are 
based upon race or ethnic origin and therefore invidiously dis-
criminate against whites in violation of their right to receive equa1 
protection of the laws pursuant to the fifth amendment.29 
A. Noncompetitive Letting of Subcontracts 
A fundamental objective of the 8(a) Program is to assist non-
competitive businesses to become competitive.Bo The SBA does not 
submit the S(a) subcontracts for competitive bidding, for to do so 
would obviously channel the subcontracts to those firms already in 
a strong competitive position. Instead, the SBA certifies small busi-
nesses as qualified S(a) firms and then negotiates subcontracts with 
those firms on a noncompetitive basis.Bl This negotiated subcontract-
ing procedure has been challenged by small businesses on the 
grounds that the federal competitive bidding statutes32 require the 
28. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194, 197 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), revd., No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973) (record failed to support finding). 
29. See note 5 supra. 
30. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-l(b) (1972), set out in note 23 supra. 
31. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-2 (1972), set out in note 23 supra. 
32. The two provisions governing procurement are 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1970) 
(military) and 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1970) (civilian). They require that contracting be 
accomplished through formal advertising and competitive bidding unless it falls within 
one of nearly 20 exceptions. 
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SBA to open 8(a) subcontracting to competitive bidding even among 
small businesses that do not otherwise qualify for the 8(a) Program.33 
To support this contention, it is possible to muster impressive 
congressional declarations of a federal policy that procurement 
procedures should "promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
... by ... utilizing competitive bidding to the maximum extent 
practicable .... "34 Nevertheless, Congress has often devalued this 
policy of efficiency in favor of utilizing federal procurement proce-
dures to achieve overriding social policy goals.35 The SBA itself was 
established not to promote the efficiency-related goals of federal 
contracting but in spite of them; the declaration of policy in the 
Small Business Act makes it clear that the goals of preservation and 
expansion of the American economy prompted Congress to forgo 
unlimited competition in government contracting in order to ensure 
that small businesses receive a "fair proportion" of government con-
tracts. 36 Even the competitive bidding statutes enumerate nearly 
twenty exceptions to unlimited competition,37 which accounted for 
the major portion of federal procurement in fiscal 1971.38 Signifi-
cantly, the federal government in the Philadelphia Plan utilized its 
contracting procedures to implement the decidedly social goal of 
increasing the number of Philadelphia-area minority tradesmen.39 
Congress can and does override efficiency-oriented goals in order 
to effectuate other policies, but the question remains whether Con-
gress intended to relieve 8(a) subcontracting from the competitive 
bidding requirements of the federal procurement statutes. In sup-
port of its current procedures, the SBA can assert that section 8(a) 
provides independent authority for the negotiated noncompetitive 
subcontracting since it empowers the SBA "to enter into contracts 
with the United States Government and any department, agency, or 
33. See, e.g., Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), revd., No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). 
34. This quote is found in the statute that established the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement. Act of Nov. 26, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-129, § 1, 83 Stat. 269. 
35. See generally Miller & Pierson, Observations an the Consistency of Federal Pro-
curement Policies with Other Federal Goals, 29 LAW & CoNTEMP, PROB. 277 (1964); Van 
Cleve, The Use of Federal Procurement To Achieve National Goals, 1961 Wis. L. R.Ev. 
566. 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 63l(a) (1970). See generally Schreiber, Small Business and Government 
Procurement, 29 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB, 390 (1964). 
37. See note l!2 supra. 
l!8. In fiscal 1971, only ll!.4 and 17.6 per cent of federal contracting, military and 
civilian respectively, was let pursuant to formal advertising procedures. Military Pro-
curement, supra note 25, at 38; Civilian Procurement, supra note 25, at 1. 
39. The Philadelphia Plan required construction contractors in the five-county 
Philadelphia area to promise to employ specific (and increasing) percentages of minority 
tradesmen in order to qualify for bidding on federal or federally assisted construction 
projects. The Plan's validity was sustained in Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
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officer thereof . [ and] to arrange for the performance of such 
contracts by negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts .... "40 
Contrarily, those who object to the 8(a) Program cite the fact that 
as section 714(b) of the Defense Production Act of 195041 evolved 
to become section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, Congress deleted 
a phrase providing that the subcontracting power may be exercised 
"[w]ithout regard to any other provision of law except the regula-
tions prescribed under section 201 of the First War Powers Act, as 
amended."42 It is argued that this deletion manifests a congressional 
intention that subsequent utilization of the section S(a) subcontract-
ing power be subject to "other provisions of law," more particu-
larly those requiring competitive bidding.43 However, this argument 
ignores the fact that the subcontracting provision was significantly 
rewritten at the same time as the deletion in a manner that indicates 
no substantial change of intent. While the predecessor statute au-
thorized the agency "to arrange for the performance of such con-
tracts by letting subcontracts,"44 the wording was revised to autho-
rize the agency "to arrange for the performance of such contracts by 
negotiating or otherwise letting subcontracts."45 Since this new lan-
guage suggests that the SBA's subcontracting power is exempt from 
normal competitive bidding requirements, a more plausible explana-
tion for the deletion of the explicit exemption contained in section 
714(b) is that Congress found that the substituted wording was ap-
propriate to reflect the shift from the defense-related aims of the De-
fense Production Act to the peacetime purposes of the newborn SBA. 
Further support for the SBA's position is derived from an exam-
ination of the entire Small Business Act. If 8(a) subcontracting re-
quired competitive bidding among small businesses generally, it 
would have precisely the same effect as another of the SBA's powers: 
the small business "set-aside," which withdraws federal contracts 
from unlimited competitive bidding and offers them for bidding 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a} (1970) (emphasis added), set out in full in note 3 supra. 
41. Section 714(b) was added to the Defense Production Act of 1950 (ch. 932, 64 Stat. 
796) by the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951 (ch. 275, § 110, 65 Stat. 140). 
These powers to contract with other agencies were given to the Small Defense Plants 
Administration, a temporary agency. In 1953 the Small Business Administration was 
created on a temporary basis, Small Business Act of 1953, ch. 282, 67 Stat. 232; and in 
1958 it was given permanent status, Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L No. 85-536, 72 
Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1970). 
42. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, ch. 275, § 110, 65 Stat. 140. This 
phrase was omitted from the Small Business Act of 1953, ch. 282, 67 Stat. 232 and did 
not reappear in the current section 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970), set out in note 3 
supra. 
43. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194, 199-200 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), revd., No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). 
44. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, ch. 275, § ll0(a), 65 Stat. 140 
(emphasis added). 
45. Small Business Act of 1953, ch. 282, § 207(d), 67 Stat. 236 (emphasis added). 
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only among small businesses.46 It is doubtful that Congress meant 
section 8(a) to be construed in a manner that renders it superfluous. 
A final challenge to the SBA's system of subcontracting is that 
"negotiation" as used in federal contracting is a term of art requiring 
competition "to the maximum practicable extent."47 Initially, this 
argument ignores the statutory wording that authorizes SBA to sub-
contract by "negotiating or otherwise letting." The fact that Congress 
eschewed using the single word "negotiating" and added the words 
"or otherwise letting" is strong evidence that it did not intend that 
8(a) subcontracting be confined to "negotiation" procedures. Even 
if we were to assume that "negotiation" procedures were applicable, 
a court should not find it "practicable" to allow well-established 
small businesses to compete for subcontracts in the context of a 
program designed to help firms that are not yet competitive if the 
8(a) Program is otherwise valid. 
B. Authority for the 8(a) Program 
A second challenge to the S(a) Program is that section S(a) of the 
Small Business Act does not provide the SBA with adequate statutory 
authority to promulgate regulations establishing a program designed 
to assist small businesses owned by "socially or economically dis-
advantaged" persons.48 Two lines of reasoning can be offered in sup-
port of the S(a) Program. The most obvious justification is simply to 
rely on the express wording of the 8(a) statute. A more involved 
route is based upon executive orders and congressional ratification. 
The first step in determining whether the S(a) statute alone is 
authority for the S(a) Program is to consider the precise wording of 
the statute. While section S(a) contains no mention of disadvantaged 
persons, that provision makes it the SBA's "duty" to exercise the S(a) 
contracting-subcontracting power "whenever it determines such ac-
tion is necessary."49 Read literally, this language gives the SBA 
broad discretion. Thus, as one court stressed, the language of the 
statute does not prevent the SBA from singling out for noncompeti-
tive subcontracting only those small businesses owned by disadvan-
taged persons.1i0 However, it has been contended that the legislative 
history of section 8(a) reveals a congressional intention that the SBA 
utilize the S(a) power only in emergency situations. In particular, 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 644 (1970). The regulations for this program are found at 14 C.F.R. 
§§ 127.15 to .15-4 (1972). 
47. Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 11, Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 
F. Supp. 194 (S.D. Fla. 1971) [hereinafter Plaintiff's BriefJ, quoting what is now 41 
C.F.R. § 1-1.301-1 (1972). 
48. See Space Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a), set out in note 3 supra. 
50. Space Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972). 
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those challenging the 8(a) Program have relied upon two reportsli1 
that accompanied the Small Business Acts of 1953 and 1958, respec-
tively. Although one report clearly recognized that the SBA as an 
agency could provide substantial services during periods of emer-
gency, 52 neither report, by its terms, purported to limit the SBA's 
8(a) power to emergency situations. An initial interpretation by the 
SBA suggesting that the use of section 8(a) be limited to periods of 
emergency was qualified by a recognition that the 8(a) power was 
being held "on a standby basis and will be activated as required to 
protect the interests of small business."53 Rather than precluding 
future use of section 8(a) in nonemergency situations, this language 
specifically acknowledges that the SBA intended to use section 8(a) 
in nonemergencies when it determined that such use would promote 
the interests of small business. Indeed, in the years between 1958 
and 1968 the 8(a) power went unexercised, and the SBA drew a sharp 
rebuke from Congress in 1960 for so narrowly construing its power.114 
Finally, a program designed "to assist small concerns owned by dis-
advantaged persons to become self-sufficient, viable businesses capa-
ble of competing effectively in the marketplace"M seems to be con-
sistent with the declared congressional policy that encouraging and 
developing the "actual and potential capacity of small business" is 
necessary to preserve "full and free competition.''116 
Although reliance solely upon the wording and history of the 
statute may satisfy many tribunals, others may feel that the S(a) Pro-
gram is "an attempt at legislation and usurps the power residing 
solely in Congress.''IS7 For these courts, it will be necessary to unravel 
the SBA's second line of authority, which involves several executive 
orders and subsequent congressional actions that arguably amount 
to a ratification of SBA's actions. Perhaps such added evidence of 
authority should be required when there exists a substantial possi-
bility that the administrative agency's actions balance competing 
policies in a manner different than would Congress were it to face 
the question. 
51. Plaintiffs' Brief, supra note 47, at 23-26, citing H.R. REP. No. 494, 83d Cong., 
1st Sess. 7-8 (1953); S. REP. No. 1714, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 5 (1958). 
52. H.R. REP. No. 494, supra note 51, at 7-8. 
53. 23 Fed. Reg. 10526 (1958). 
54. H.R. REP. No. 2235, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1960): 
It is the conclusion of the [House Select Committee on Small Business) that the 
interpretation of [section 8(a)) by SBA is too narrow and limited; that it was the 
intention of Congress that it would be used whenever necessary to assure that small 
business receives its fair share of Government procurement and not just in a 
"national emergency." 
55. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-l(b) (1972), set out in note 23 supra. 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 63l(a) (1970). 
57. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194,202 (S.D. Fla. 1971), 
revd., No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). 
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Accepting as an initial matter that the class of disadvantaged 
persons-who are the intended beneficiaries of the 8(a) Program-
is largely populated by members of racial and ethnic minority 
groups,118 recent executive orders aimed at increasing minority busi-
nesses may lend support to the 8(a) Program. The SBA has asserted 
that these executive orders, numbers 11458,rm 11518,60 and 11625,61 
authorize the 8(a) Program.62 Some doubt, however, is cast upon the 
validity of this assertion by the fact that the Program appears to have 
been operated on a limited basis before any of these orders were 
issued, although Executive Orders 11458 and 11518 did precede the 
amendment by the SBA of its 8(a) regulations.63 A second problem 
is that while both of these orders exhibit a presidential concern for 
small businesses owned by minority group members, and portions of 
11518 direct the SBA to be sensitive to the interests of those busi-
nesses,64 neither directs the establishment of the 8(a) Program. The 
third executive order, number 11625, however, supersedes 11458 
58. See text accompanying notes 94-95 infra. 
59. This order, entitled "Prescribing Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating 
a National Program for Minority Enterprise," was issued on March 5, 1969 (34 Fed. Reg. 
4937) and has been superseded by Exec. Order No. 11625, 3 C.F.R. 213 (Comp. 1971). 
60, !l C.F.R. 530 (1972). Entitled "Providing for the Increased Representation of the 
Interests of Small Business Concerns before Departments and Agencies of the United 
States Government," the order directs the SBA to act as a spokesman for the small 
business community before other agencies. Section 4 provides that "[i]n performing 
the responsibilities and duties placed on it by this order, the Small Busines.s Ad.minis· 
tration shall particularly consider the needs and interests of minority-owned small 
business concerns and of members of minority groups seeking entry into the busines.s 
community." 3 C.F.R. 531 (1972). 
61. !l C.F.R. 213 (Comp. 1971). Issued in October of 1971, the order was entitled 
"Prescribing Additional Arrangements for Developing and Coordinating a National 
Program for Minority Business Enterprise." 
62. Brief for Appellants at 10, Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, No. 72-
1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). 
Two court of appeals decisions have stated that executive orders in the area of 
federal contracting have "the force and effect of law" when proceeding within a 
delegation from Congress. Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 7 (3d Cir. 1964); 
Farkas v. Texas Instrument Co., 375 F.2d 629, 632 &: n.l (5th Cir. 1967). However, this 
statement has been dismissed as irrelevant in the case where there is no specific statutory 
authorization. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 167 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). In this situation, Contractors Association employed the 
analysis suggested by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 634-38 (1952) (concurring opinion). Given the history of section 8(a) (text 
accompanying notes 48-56 supra) and the congressional response to the S(a) Program 
(text accompanying notes 67-73 infra), it is possible that this analysis would uphold the 
Program as a valid use of executive authority even if section S(a) does not authorize the 
Program. See 442 F.2d at 166-71, 
63. It appears from one case that the S(a) Program was operated in 1968, prior to 
the earliest Executive Order, No. ll458, which was issued in 1969. Ray :Baillie Trash 
Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D. Fla. 1971), revd., No. 72-ll63 
(5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973); note 59 supra. However, the S(a) regulations were implemented 
after Executive Orders II458 and ll518, in November 1970. 35 Fed. Reg. 17833; notes 
59-60 supra. 
64. See note 60 supra. 
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and orders all federal agencies to "continue all current efforts to 
foster and promote minority business enterprises."65 Executive 
Order 11625 further defines a minority business enterprise as one 
"owned or controlled by one or more socially or economically dis-
advantaged persons."66 Significantly, at the time of this order's issu-
ance the 8(a) Program appears to have been the sole federal program 
for businesses owned by "socially or economically disadvantaged per-
sons." Thus, the 8(a) Program was not established at the direct order 
of the President, but it apparently does proceed at his express com-
mand. Insofar as a court recognizes the power of the President as 
Chief Executive to control the discretion of his administrators in the 
execution of their statutory powers, these executive orders do con-
tribute to the authority for the 8(a) Program. 
Congress has also left little doubt that it too supports the manner 
in which the SBA has used its 8(a) power. The 8(a) Program's opera-
tion has been explaineq. in detail in a number of House and Senate 
Committee hearings,67 two of which were primarily devoted to re-
viewing the 8(a) Program.68 When Congress has had ample oppor-
tunity to revise a regulation through amendment or repeal of the 
authorizing statute, the refusal to do so is at least some evidence of 
congressional approval of the administrative interpretation.69 More-
over, having learned of the 8(a) Program, Congress authorized the 
expenditure of 8 and 12 million dollars in fiscal 197270 and fiscal 
1973,71 respectively, for the purpose of supplying the aggregate cost 
65. 3 C.F.R. 216 (Comp. 1971). 
66. 3 C.F.R. 217 (Comp. 1971). 
67. Hearings on Government Minority Small Business Programs Before the Subcomm. 
on Minority Small Business Enterprises of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 2, at 327-46 (1972); Hearings on SBA's 8(a) Subcontracting Pro-
gram Before the Subcomm. on Government Procurement of the Senate Select Comm. on 
Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Hearings]; Hearings on Gov• 
emment Small Business Programs Before the Subcomm. on Minority Small Business En• 
terprise of the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., vol. I, at 
50-64, 231 (1971); Hearings on Small Business and Labor Surplus Area Set-Asides and 
8(a) Subcontracts Before the Subcomm. on Government Procurement of the Senate Select 
Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Hearings]; Hear-
ings on Organization and Operation of the Small Business Administration (1970) Before 
the House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 268-90, A-1 to -40 
(1970); Hearings on S. 2609, S. 3528, and S. 3699 Before the Subcomm. on Small Busi-
ness of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970); 
Hearings on Federal Minority Enterprise Program Before the Subcomm. on Small Busi-
ness of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1970); 
Hearings on Small Business Administration's Programs and Policies-1969-Before the 
House Select Comm. on Small Business, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 12, 27-29, 41 (1969). 
68. 1971 Hearings, supra note 67; 1970 Hearings, supra note 67. 
69. See Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580, 589 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
933 (1960). Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
70. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN• 
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1972, Appendix, at 958, 960 (1971). 
71. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN• 
MENT, FISCAL YEAR 1973, 933, 935, 937 (1972). 
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differential between prime contract prices and 8(a) subcontract 
prices. Congressional appropriation has recently been accepted as evi-
dence of authority in such diverse instances as the Vietnam War72 
and the Philadelphia Plan.73 In this manner, it is submitted, Con-
gress has ratified the 8(a) Program's focus on "socially or econom-
ically disadvantaged persons." 
C. Equal Protection 
The fundamental legal obstacle to developing programs of reme-
dial aid for racial or ethnic minorities has been the courts' inability 
to devise a decorous retreat from the stringent doctrines developed 
to prohibit discrimination against such minorities. While the Su-
preme Court has never adopted the view expressed by the elder 
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, that "[o]ur Con-
stitution is color-blind . . . ."74 or held that racial discriminations 
are unconstitutional per se, 75 racial classification has evoked the most 
demanding standards of judicial review imposed by the Court.76 It is 
in this context that the 8(a) Program and its eligibility standard of 
"socially or economically disadvantaged persons" must be consid-
ered. 
There are two possible grounds for claiming that the 8(a) Pro-
gram embodies a racial classification. The first is that the regula-
tions governing the Program are discriminatory as written. Alter-
72. See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), a/fd., 443 F.2d 1039 
(2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), a/fd., 443 F.2d 1039 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). 
73. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
74. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1895). 
75. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
76. In reviewing classifications based upon race or ethnic origin, the Court has re-
quired that the state show a compelling governmental interest, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
The question has arisen whether racial classifications designed to benefit disadvan-
taged minorities, so-called "benign discrimination," should be subjected to a relaxed 
standard of review. While much discussed by commentators, benign discrimination has 
not found general acceptance in the courts. A recent case that may elucidate the judi-
cial position on reverse discrimination is DeFunis v. Odegaard, 40 U.S.L.W. 2211 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. 1971), appeal docketed, No. 42198 (Wash. Sup. Ct.), in which a law school's 
preference for minority applicants was held to violate equal protection. See generally 
Alexander &: Alexander, The New Racism: Analysis of Racial and Ethnic Criteria in 
Decision-Making, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 190 (1972); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal 
World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 
363 (1966); O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups 
to Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699 (1971); Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separa-
tism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L REv. 1553 (1969); Comment, 
The Legality of Affirmative Measures To Achieve and Maintain Integration in a New 
Town, 59 GEO. LJ. 335 (1970); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 1065, 1104-20 (1969). 
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natively, it may be alleged that while the regulation is superficially 
neutral with respect to race, the SBA has discriminatorily applied the 
standard. Ultimately, however, resolution of either ground will tum 
upon the judiciary's sophistication in dealing with the emerging 
legal term of art that is the basis of the 8(a) eligibility classification: 
"socially or economically disadvantaged persons." 
The question whether the 8(a) eligibility regulation is discrim-
inatory on its face arises from the extraordinary specification of 
ethnic and racial minority groups in that regulation. After estab-
lishing that the eligibility criterion is "social or economic disadvan-
tage" the regulation continues, "This category often includes, but is 
not restricted to, Black Americans, American Indians, Spanish Amer-
icans, Oriental Americans, Eskimos and Aleuts."77 Clearly, this lan-
guage does not literally mandate racial or ethnic classification. 
Indeed, the express mention that the "disadvantaged" category is not 
restricted to the named minority groups is a disclaimer of discrimina-
tion on the face of the regulation. It might be suggested that the 
mere naming of minority groups within the regulation is so condu-
cive to discriminatory administration that on this ground alone the 
regulation should be treated as discriminatory on its face. However, 
in addition to the absence of authority for such a position, sound 
historical reasons exist for the enumeration of specific minority 
groups. While most SBA financing is designed to aid small busi-
nesses considered marginal by other lending institutions, its credit 
standards have traditionally been too high for minority businessmen. 
Consequently, minority communities became disenchanted with the 
SBA and were convinced that it was not a viable source for business 
assistance.78 Specific mention of certain minorities in the 8(a) eligi-
bility regulation might have been motivated by a belief that affirma-
tive steps were necessary to convince members of these minorities 
that the SBA has finally developed a program capable of aiding the 
relatively high risk enterprises that they are likely to start. Indeed, 
one authoritative figure in the SBA intimated just such a motive.79 
Thus, as two courts have held,80 there is no tenable ground to hold 
the regulation discriminatory on its face. 
A remaining issue is whether a classification defined in terms 
of "social or economic disadvantage" is itself vulnerable to constitu-
77. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-I(c) (1972), set out in note 23 supra. 
78. T. CRoss, supra note 1, at 97-102. 
79. Knebel, Legal Basis for SBA's Minority Enterprise Program, 30 FED. B.J. 270, 
275-76 (1971). (Mr. Knebel is General Counsel of the SBA.) See also Kaplan, supra note 
76, at 386-87, which suggests that advertising directed at blacks could achieve the goal 
of increased black employment without discriminating against whites in hiring. 
80. Space Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972); Kleen-Rite 
Janitorial Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil Action No. 71-1968-W (D. Mass., Sept. 21, 1971). 
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tional challenge. It seems clear that absent a racially discriminatory 
application of such a standard, it is a social welfare classification 
easily sustained under relaxed standards of judicial review.81 
The second question is whether the regulation, though literally 
neutral, is discriminatorily applied by the SBA. Before reaching the 
merits of this allegation, however, a court must first decide whether 
a plaintiff has standing to argue discriminatory application. While 
recent Supreme Court cases have relaxed traditional standing re-
quirements, a remaining prerequisite for standing is that the plain-
tiff allege and demonstrate an "injury in fact" resulting from the 
challenged agency action.82 This would presumably necessitate a 
showing that the plaintiff firm is owned by "socially or economically 
disadvantaged persons" and that it would have benefited from the 
S(a) Program had it been properly administered. Because only those 
firms that apply for 8(a) benefits can receive them, the plaintiff firm 
should also be required to apply for an S(a) subcontract before al-
leging that the SBA is discriminating against it. Two courts that 
have considered this standing issue have denied standing to plaintiff 
firms that failed to fulfill these requirements. 83 
Once a court is satisfied that a plaintiff has standing to raise the 
claim that the SBA has racially discriminated in applying its regula-
tions, the merits of that allegation are controlled by the doctrines 
that have developed from the historic case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins.84 
It was in Yick Wo that the Supreme Court first recognized the prop-
osition that a neutrally worded statute may be discriminatorily 
applied resulting in a constitutional violation. From Yick Wo has 
arisen a long line of Supreme Court cases85 firmly establishing and 
refining the use of statistics to prove discrimination when, as in the 
S(a) litigation, no alternative proof of discrimination is offered by 
complainants. The standards for such proof have been understand-
ably very demanding. If a plaintiff can show, however, that not a 
single member of a group putatively entitled to benefit under a 
statute or regulation did in fact so benefit, then he may utilize this 
total exclusion to establish a prima fade case of discrimination. The 
burden of going forward is thus shifted to the defendant, who must 
produce evidence showing that prohibited criteria were not em-
81. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
82. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); 
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). 
83, Fortec Constructors v. Kleppe, 41 U.S.L.W. 2195 (D.D.C., Oct. 1, 1972); Space 
Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972). Note that application 
for S(a) benefits may be necessary only for the purpose of challenging the S(a) regula-
tions on equal protection grounds. Thus, in Fortec Constructors the court held that a 
nonapplicant could challenge the SBA's statutory authority for the Program. 
84. HS U.S. 356 (1886). 
85. E.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 
202 (1965); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) 
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ployed.86 However, because unofficial data establishes that there has 
not been a total exclusion of disadvantaged whites,87 it is doubtful 
that any S(a) plaintiff could successfully utilize this argument. 
When there is neither total exclusion nor other suspicious fac-
tors,88 a court may test plaintiff's allegations by an alternative 
method. The plaintiff must first characterize the existence of a class 
theoretically covered by the statute or regulation if the law does not 
purport to be applicable to the entire population. The racial pro-
portions of the theoretical class must then be proved or estimated. 
Next, the plaintiff must document the racial proportions of the in-
dividuals actually affected by the law and, finally, these two propor-
tions-the theoretical and the actual-must be compared to see if 
the deviation is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. A case that illustrates each step to perfection is Cassel v. Texas,89 
where the Court rejected a black defendant's claim that because the 
black proportion of grand jurors was less than the black proportion 
of the county's population, Texas had discriminated against blacks 
in the selection of grand jurymen.90 The plurality opinion of Justice 
Reed established the class theoretically capable of serving on juries, 
defined by statute to be those literate citizen freeholders qualified to 
vote.91 Then Justice Reed found the black component of that theo-
retical class to be 6.5 per cent, notwithstanding the fact that the gen-
eral population of Dallas County was 15.5 per cent black.92 Finally, 
Justice Reed found the actual percentage of black jurors to be 6.7 
per cent.93 A comparison of the actual representation of blacks 
on grand juries with the theoretical proportion could not establish 
a prima fade case. 
The Cassel approach provides an analytic framework that can be 
used to test claims that the SBA has discriminatorily applied its 8(a) 
regulations. As one court has observed,94 the fact that the racial 
86. E.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 
404 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 591 (1935). 
87. See note 98 infra. 
88. Statistics showing a smaller percentage of black jurors than blacks in the popu• 
lation, when combined with evidence that jury commissioners knew the racial identities 
of potential jurors, has been held to make a prima facie case of discrimination. Alexan-
der v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967). 
89. 339 U.S. 282 (1950). 
90. The plurality opinion of Justice Reed, in which three other justices concurred, 
dearly stated that disparity between the racial proportions of the population and the 
class of potential jurors did not prove discrimination, 339 U.S. at 284-86. Justice Frank-
furter, with whom two justices concurred, implied this when he stated that a state could 
define qualifications for grand jury service that were relevant to performance, 339 U.S. 
at 291. Both Justice Reed and Justice Frankfurter went on to reverse the judgment on 
other grounds. 
91. 339 U.S. at 284 n.4. 
92. 339 U.S. at 284-85. 
93. 339 U.S. at 285. 
94. Responding to plaintiff's contention that the SBA is discriminatory in the ad-
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proportion of S(a) subcontractors differs significantly from that of 
the population at large may not be sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination because the theoretical class eligible for 
S(a) is not the population at large but a subclass within it, the dis-
advantaged, that has markedly different racial characteristics. Indeed, 
there can be little doubt that the class of people most disadvantaged 
with respect to entry into the business world contains many mem-
bers of minority races. The relevant question is whether the individ-
ual's background demonstrates a consistent deprivation of the oppor-
tunity to acquire the prerequisites of business success: education, 
related employment experience, and access to financing. Such de-
privations are, of course, not limited to minority groups, but 
are shared by other segments of society. For example, the SBA has 
asserted that white individuals in Appalachia qualify as disadvan-
taged. 95 But, in the final analysis, it would not seem unreasonable 
to find that a high percentage of those who suffer substantial dis-
advantages in the business sphere are members of minority racial or 
ethnic groups. 
The final consideration in characterizing the racial proportions 
of the theoretical class is that only those firms that apply to the SBA 
under the S(a) Program can conceivably receive S(a) subcontracts. 
Whereas officials such as jury commissioners must choose jurymen 
from some pre-existing pool of names, such as the voter registration 
rolls, the SBA has no comparable list of firms theoretically eligible 
for S(a) benefits and must rely upon those who apply to the Program. 
Illustratively, assume that a court determined that approximately 
twenty-five per cent of the disadvantaged were American Indians, 
and, therefore, ideally twenty-five per cent of the 8(a) subcontractors 
ministration of S(a), as evidenced by a letter from an SBA attorney advising that 1381 
of the 1708 subcontracts were awarded to firms owned by blacks, 33 to Asians, 16 to 
whites, 15 to Puerto Ricans, 207 to Spanish-Americans, and 56 to American Indians, 
Judge Newman offered the following: 
Plaintiff contends these figures establish at least a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. While such figures would serve that purpose in a claim of discrimination in 
jury selection, where all adults are eligible, and perhaps in some employment 
cases, where it can be assumed a cross-section of the population was eligible, it is 
highly doubtful whether the figures will suffice here to establish discrimination 
in a specialized program of limited eligibility. This program is open only to small 
concerns owned by disadvantaged persons. There is no basis for assuming that 
the ratio of such firms owned by Caucasians and, more significantly, the percentage 
of those who apply for this program, are anything like the proportion of Cauca-
sians in the population generally. In a case like this, a prim a f acie showing of dis-
crimination would require some evidence that eligible Caucasian firms who applied 
for this special program were being accepted and awarded subcontracts at a signif-
icantly lower rate than firms owned by non-Caucasians. 
Space Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil No. 15,170 (D. Conn., Aug. 18, 1972) (emphasis added). 
But see Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973) 
(court suggests need only show racial composition of applicants). 
95. Hearings on H.R. lJBOJ and H.R. 15471 Before the Subcomm. on Small Busi-
ness of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1972) 
(testimony of SBA Administrator Kleppe). 
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should also be American Indians. Assume further that so few Indian-
owned firms applied to S(a) that even if the SBA had accepted every 
American Indian applicant, they would still comprise only ten 
per cent of the beneficiaries of the S(a) Program. It could hardly be 
argued that the theoretical class is all disadvantaged persons since 
this characterization would result in a finding that there is a wide 
disparity between the theoretical and actual percentages of Ameri-
can Indians benefited by S(a) and that a prima facie case of dis-
crimination against Indians has therefore been established, a non-
sensical result in this situation. Since the SBA can grant benefits 
only to firms that apply for aid, the theoretical class must be com-
posed of only those firms, minority- and nonminority-owned, that 
apply for aid. Assuming that tightly knit minority communities tend 
readily to transmit information, it is likely that a higher proportion 
of disadvantaged minority businessmen have learned of and applied 
to the relatively new S(a) Program than disadvantaged nonminori-
ties. 
Once the theoretical percentage of racial subclasses has been de-
termined within the class eligible and applying for benefits, there is 
yet a further consideration. Perhaps because statistics at best demon-
strate a tendency that may or may not reflect intentional discrimina-
tion, the Supreme Court has tolerated substantial deviations between 
the theoretical and actual classes. In one instance, the theoretical 
percentage of blacks eligible to serve as grand jurors was roughly 
double that of the actual percentage of blacks chosen and yet there 
was no finding of prima fade discrimination.96 There is no reason 
to believe that more demanding standards would be imposed in the 
case of a statistical showing of discrimination in favor of blacks and 
other minority groups. Indeed, while the courts have not accepted 
a relaxed standard of review for "benign discrimination,"97 it is pos-
sible that they might more readily tolerate statistical deviation favor-
ing minorities. 
For all of these reasons, it is clear that the infrequent granting of 
S(a) benefits to whites under a classification of "socially and econom-
ically disadvantaged" would not in itself lead to a finding of prima 
fade discrimination, even though whites are a majority of the popu-
lation. Assume, for example, that whites comprise only ten per cent 
of the theoretical class entitled to benefits-that is, those who are 
not only disadvantaged but who also apply for S(a) benefits. Given 
this assumption, the granting of ten per cent of 8(a) subcontracts to 
96. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 205-09 (1965). The theoretical class was 26 per 
cent black; blacks constituted 10 to 15 per cent of the grand and petit jury panels. It is 
possible to read the Court's opinion as concentrating on the absolute percentage dif-
ference of about IO per cent rather than the relative difference between 26 and 15 per 
cent. 380 U.S. at 208-09. 
97. See note 76 supra. 
December 1972] Notes 393 
whites would be perfectly appropriate, and a court might well toler-
ate the deviation existing if the subclass of whites receiving benefits 
were only five per cent. But, holding the actual percentage at five 
per cent, if we assume the theoretical class of eligible white appli-
cants is thirty per cent, the deviation would then suggest a prima 
facie case of discrimination. 
It is readily observable that a court's estimation of the theoret-
ical percentage of eligible white applicants may be dispositive of 
the issue whether prima facie discrimination has been established. 
The Supreme Court's willingness to tolerate substantial deviation 
may prove of little help to the SBA in light of unofficial figures re-
garding administration of the program. If, as appears, approximately 
one per cent of S(a) subcontracts have actually been awarded to 
predominantly white-owned firms,98 then a court must conclude 
either that virtually all of the disadvantaged applicants to S(a) were 
minority group members or that a prima facie case of discrimination 
has been established. 
To this point, the analysis has considered only whether a prima 
facie case of discrimination can be established against the SBA. 
Assuming that plaintiff succeeds in establishing such a case, the SBA 
can still present proof that nonminority applicants were not rejected 
on racial or ethnic grounds and thus overcome the prima facie case. 
If the SBA's evidence of nondiscrimination is insufficient, a finding 
of discrimination would not necessarily vitiate the S(a) Program. 
Rather, it would suggest only that administration resulting in merely 
one per cent of benefits to whites is not justifiable. But significantly, 
the analysis further suggests that if five to ten per cent of subcontracts 
were awarded to whites, the Program might be immune from a statis-
tical demonstration of discrimination. 
Courts have generally not utilized a statistical discrimination 
analysis to evaluate the discrimination charges in the S(a) litigation.99 
A number of explanations can be offered for this failure. Statistics 
regarding the beneficiaries of the S(a) Program may not always have 
been available or may not have been presented by the litigants. In 
addition, courts may be unwilling to weigh and measure the racial 
proportions of the beneficiaries of the S(a) Program for fear that it 
will open the door to an attack on any federal activity that dispro-
portionately benefits any racial or ethnic group, raising the spectre 
of quotas. Third, it may be difficult to define the theoretical class 
of whites entitled to benefits, absent a relatively precise definition of 
what the class of "socially or economically disadvantaged persons" 
98. In one area, whites received 3 of 225 8(a) subcontracts. Ray Baillie Trash Haul-
ing, Inc. v. Kleppe, 334 F. Supp. 194, 198 (S.D. Fla. 1971), revd., No. 72-1163 (5th 
Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). See also note 94 supra. 
99. In one case the issue of discriminatory granting of benefits apparently was not 
raised. Kleen-Rite Janitorial Servs., Inc. v. Laird, Civil Action No. 71-1968-W (D. Mass., 
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embraces; yet, to require the SBA to delineate detailed selection 
criteria and the proportionate weight given to these criteria would 
act as a significant constraint on the SBA's discretion. While these 
explanations merit attention, it is submitted that the discrimination 
issue cannot be adequately resolved without a statistical analysis. 
To focus only on the social welfare aspect of the classification on its 
face, and to condone it on that basis, ignores the possibility of 
discriminatory application. On the other hand, to dismiss the 
benefits granted to white applicants as tokenism and hold the 
classification an invidious racial discrimination without examining 
the racial percentages in the theoretical class entitled to benefits is 
unwarranted both in terms of constitutional theory and public 
policy. 
It might be questioned whether discriminatory administration 
of the 8(a) Program-favoring minorities while ignoring disadvan-
taged persons who are not members of minority groups-could be 
justified on the grounds that it is a benign, remedial discrimination 
that has a rational basis or, alternatively, that such racial-ethnic dis-
crimination is justified by a compelling state interest.100 Even if a 
court were faced with a remedial racial classification expressly and 
clearly established by Congress, it is uncertain whether such argu-
ments could prevail;101 but because of several statutory barriers the 
merits of these constitutional issues should not be reached in the 
context of 8(a) litigation. 
Perhaps an insurmountable difficulty in attempting to justify a 
remedial racial classification in the 8(a) Program is that the SBA's 
own 8(a) regulations declare that eligibility in the Program is not 
limited to minority racial or ethnic groups. It is well settled that 
an agency is bound by its own regulations so long as they remain in 
effect.102 Thus, to administer the Program in a manner inconsistent 
with the eligibility regulation is to act without authority. The con-
stitutional issue should not be reached unless a court finds no con-
flict between the SBA's actions and its own S(a) eligibility regula-
tion. 
A second difficulty arises from the enactment by Congress of leg-
Sept. 21, 1971). In another the issue was raised, but the judge said that insufficient evi-
dence was presented. See note 94 supra. Finally, in a third case the lower court leaped 
from the fact that only one per cent of the Program's beneficiaries were whites to the 
conclusion that there was discrimination and that any white participation was mere 
tokenism. Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 3M F. Supp. 194, 201 (S.D. Fla. 
1971), reud., No. 72-1163 (5th Cir., Jan. 5, 1973). 
100. See note 76 supra. 
IOI. Analogous arguments have been examined in the context of preferential ad-
mission to college for minority groups and have been found subject to severe limita-
tions. O'Neil, supra note 76, at 705-18. 
102. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89 (1957), citing United States ex rel. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265-67 (1954). 
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islation for another SBA program which sheds substantial light on 
the congressional interpretation of the meaning of "disadvantaged 
persons." Congress recently passed the Small Business Investment 
Act Amendments of 1972,1°3 which provide statutory benefits for a 
small business investment company "[whose] investments will be 
made solely in small business concerns which will contribute to a 
well-balanced national economy by facilitating ownership in such 
concerns by persons whose participation in the free enterprise system 
is hampered because of social or economic disadvantages .•.. "10¼ 
Although the statute offers no definition of "persons . . . whose 
participation in the free enterprise system is hampered by social or 
economic disadvantages," Congressman Stephens explained to the 
House of Representatives his subcommittee's interpretation that "the 
undertaking should extend to all disadvantaged persons, not merely 
to those who are handicapped because they are members of minority 
races."105 Likewise, Senator Sparkman, chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, explained to the 
Senate that this program would give statutory recognition to com-
panies that "had been established for the sole purpose of assisting 
members of minority races and other persons whose participation 
in our free-enterprise economy has been hampered by social or 
economic disadvantages."106 The House Report explaining the leg-
islation further supports the conclusion that the beneficiaries of 
the new program are to be "concerns owned by socially or eco-
nomically disadvantaged persons without regard to race."107 It is 
important to remember that this legislative history demonstrates 
congressional intention and interpretation of "social or economic 
disadvantage" only as those words are used in the Small Business 
Investment Act Amendments of 1972 and not in the 8(a) eligibility 
regulation. Nevertheless, this history is persuasive as to Congress' 
prior understanding of the meaning of "social or economic disad-
vantage," and may even represent a congressional view as to how that 
phrase should henceforth be interpreted. Thus, it may be difficult for 
the SBA to sustain a racial classification without seriously weakening 
its statutory authority, insofar as the SBA relies on a congressional 
ratification theory.108 In addition, even if the SBA could justify a 
program granting benefits to disadvantaged persons solely by virtue 
of its discretionary statutory authority, it might be questioned 
103. Pub. L. No. 92-595, 86 Stat. 1314. 
104. Pub. L. No. 92-595, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 1314. 
105. 118 CoNG. R.Ec. H9526 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1972). 
106. 118 CONG. R.Ec. Sl7742 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1972). 
107. H.R. REP. No. 92-1428, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972). The House Committee also 
deleted the phrase "minority enterprise" from the bill. Id. at 4. 
108. See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra. 
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whether the statutory authority could go so far as to permit the 
discretionary establishment of a racial classification.109 
Finally, the impact of section 601110 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
should be considered. It provides: 
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
But however clear the language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act may 
appear, the courts have refused to apply the terms literally.111 When 
remedial preferences were at issue, one court justified a program by 
claiming that the congressional intent was not to freeze the status 
quo.112 Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of the three above-men-
tioned difficulties suggests that the constitutional issue of reverse dis-
crimination should not be reached in the S(a) litigation. 
D. Policy Considerations 
Having delineated the legal issues in the S(a) litigation, there 
remain to be explored certain basic policy considerations that may 
affect the ultimate resolution of the S(a) litigation. Outstanding 
among these considerations is the enormous social benefit that could 
result from the establishment of a viable minority business com-
munity and the significant contribution that the S(a) Program can 
make toward that goal. Sensitivity to this concern alone should dic-
tate a judicial reluctance to impede the minority enterprise effort. 
Another significant factor in the decision-making process may 
well be the court's understanding of the role that S(a)'s eligibility 
standard of social or economic disadvantage can play in solving the 
problems of minority groups. A principal drawback to granting 
remedial treatment to minorities has been the reverse discrimina-
tion-equal protection problem. As the nation has become increas-
ingly sensitive to the problems of minority groups and more willing 
to provide them with special benefits, there has not been a corre-
sponding shift in legal doctrine to accommodate benign classifica-
tions by scrutinizing them under less stringent standards than those 
applied to discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities.113 
109. See text accompanying notes 48-54 supra. 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). 
111. See, e.g., Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171-74 (lid Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 
1154, 1162 (S.D. Ill. 1971); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.N.J. 1970). 
112. Contractors Assn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
113. See note 76 supra. 
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Thus, the stage has been set for the appearance of programs that 
define their beneficiaries in terms of a class largely, but not exclu-
sively, composed of minority group members: "socially or econom-
ically disadvantaged persons." Professor Paul Freund early recog-
nized this stratagem when in 1964 he stated: 
A head-on clash of principle can be averted, in most cases wisely in 
my judgement, by framing programs of aid in terms of reaching the 
most disadvantaged segment of the community, whether economi-
cally, educationally, or politically. And if these happen to be in fact 
predominantly Negroes, no principle of race-creed classification has 
been violated.114 
The alternatives to accepting such classifications are truly un-
inviting. As Professor Freund noted, to single out racial and ethnic 
groups for special treatment is to precipitate a "head-on clash of 
principle." This would require new constitutional doctrines apply-
ing a relaxed standard of review to those discriminations that benefit 
minorities. Although this possibility has been much discussed, com-
mentators have agreed that this approach has substantial dangers.ms 
The other alternative is to surrender entirely the idea of remedial 
treatment for minorities in recognition of the fact that case law 
developed in a different context requires such strict scrutiny of 
racial preferences that any remedial treatment of minorities is un-
likely to be sustained.116 "Disadvantaged" classifications avoid both 
these alternatives but have their own costs: they appear to manip-
ulate legal doctrine to achieve a specific social goal. The severity 
of the alternatives, however, may force many to accept the validity 
of disadvantaged classifications. 
A third consideration that may affect the tenor of the 8(a) 
litigation is Congress' recent incorporation of the concept of social 
or economic disadvantage in federal law. Before the passage of the-
Small Business Investment Act Amendments of 1972 there was room 
for believing that Congress would not accept the concept of a dis-
advantaged class. There can be little question now that Congress 
has expressly endorsed that concept. Moreover, there are indications 
that Congress is willing to defer to the SBA's standards in defining 
and implementing the classification. As Congressman Stephens re-
ported to the House, "[The Act] does not contain specific language 
defining what is meant by 'disadvantaged persons.' The committee 
II4. Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of the Law, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 199, 204 
(1964). 
115. See articles cited in note 76 supra. 
116. In recent years the Court has sustained only one use of a racial or ethnic clas-
sification, the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from the West Coast during World War 
II. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The wartime circumstances of 
Korematsu make it shaky precedent. See, e.g., Rostow, Japanese-Ameri,;:an Ctl$es-4 
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). 
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believes it is sound policy to leave such details to administrative 
regulation ... .''117 
Another consideration is the courts' estimation of the magnitude 
of the hardships that the S(a) Program might cause nonminority 
government contractors. In assessing this burden it is significant that 
total S(a) subcontracting amounts to a fraction of one per cent of all 
federal procurement, leaving virtually all of the remaining ninety-
nine-plus per cent for nonminority enterprises.118 Furthermore, the 
SBA has issued regulations prohibiting the withdrawal of contracts 
for the S(a) Program "[w]here small business concerns are dependent 
in whole or in significant part on recurring Government contracts."119 
Properly administered, this safeguard should ensure that S(a) sub-
contracting does not work hardships on isolated small businesses. 
The final consideration may be the courts' understanding of the 
essential motivation for the S(a) Program. It is easy to misconstrue 
the Program and assume that the SBA intends to parcel out govern-
ment contracts and other benefits in direct proportion to the racial 
percentages of the population, thus initiating a system of quotas. 
The motivation and objectives of the Program are, however, quite 
different. In its simplest form, the 8(a) Program is nothing more 
than a classroom for dispensing invaluable experience to those 
individuals who have been prevented from obtaining that experi-
ence by normal methods. 
III. EFFECT OF 8(a) LITIGATION ON FEDERAL PROGRAMS To Arn 
MINORITY BUSINESSES 
A final aspect of the S(a) litigation that merits consideration is 
the possible impact of judicial resolution of the equal protection 
issue on other programs in the federal government's newborn mi-
nority enterprise effort. While there are over eighty federal programs 
that can provide services to minority-owned business,120 the vast bulk 
of these programs were designed to aid the general public, and there-
fore provide only incidental benefit to minority enterprises. In fact, 
the only assistance designed specifically for the minority entrepre-
neur and his special problems is provided primarily by two federal 
agencies-the SBA and the Office of Minority Business Enterprise 
(OMBE), which was recently established in the Department of 
Commerce.121 
117. 118 CONG. REc. H9526 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1972). 
118, See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
119. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8•l(d)(3) (1972), set out in note 23 supra. 
120. See OFFICE OF MINORITY BuSINl!SS ENTERPRISE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL 
CATALOG OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS AsslsnNG MINORITY ENTERPRISE (1971). 
121. OMBE has been operating since the issuance of Exec. Order No. 11458, 34 Fed. 
Reg. 4937 (1969). It was formally recognized in Exec. Order No. 11625, 3 C.F.R. 213 
(Comp. 1971). 
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There are three federal activities that utilize the eligibility 
criteria of social or economic disadvantage: the SBA's S(a) Program, 
the SBA's new class of small business investment companies created 
by the Small Business Investment Act Amendments of I 972, and 
the range of programs administered by OMBE. While the S(a) 
Program has been in full operation for over two years, it has been 
less than a year since OMBE received its first significant appropri-
ation122 and only a few months since the new companies were 
authorized. All of these activities can derive guidance from the 
express congressional recognition that social or economic disad-
vantage is not restricted to minority group members, an advantage 
that the S(a) Program did not initially have. 
One immediate direction that the SBA and OMBE can glean 
from the S(a) litigation is that both agencies should make increased 
efforts to publicize their programs in areas where there are disadvan-
taged nonminorities. If, despite this publicity effort, a high pro-
portion of the applicants for assistance are minority group members, 
records should be kept to evidence that fact. The agencies should also 
document and retain the reasons for every rejection to prove that 
qualified nonminority applicants were not rejected on a racial or 
ethnic basis. These suggestions presuppose that any quarrel the 
courts may have with the S(a) Program and others like it will not be 
with the "disadvantaged" concept itself but with agencies' imple-
mentation of it. 
In carving out a "disadvantaged" classification, the SBA has 
offered an imaginative solution to the long-standing problem of how 
the government may constitutionally direct significant benefits to 
minority groups. That Congress recognizes the advantages of this 
approach can no longer be questioned. Serious constitutional ques-
tions may arise, however, if programs based upon such a criterion 
result in few nonminority beneficiaries, although the precise cause 
of this underrepresentation may not be intentional discrimination. 
Rather than endanger the promising "disadvantaged" concept by 
allowing it to become a euphemism for minority group individuals, 
it is suggested that federal agencies pursue actively those nonminority 
individuals who are also disadvantaged. If this course were taken, it 
is unlikely that the courts would seriously entertain any challenge 
to these remedial programs. 
122. OMBE was originally granted 4 million dollars for fiscal 1972. This was subse-
quently increased to 40 million dollars. For fiscal 1973 OMBE requested 60 million 
dollars. Stans, Foreword to U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PROGRESS OF THE MINORITY BUSINESS 
ENTERPRISE PROGRAM 8 (1972). 
